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Abstract
Discussion about resettlement is increasing worldwide.
Traditional resettlement countries look to the EU to estab-
lish new programs to expand the use of this durable solu-
tion. Some EU Member States appear most interested in
resettlement for the potential it might offer in resolving
the problems of smuggling, high asylum-seeker arrivals,
and widespread anti-immigrant tendencies. This article
sets out four key arguments on: the reasons for conducting
resettlement; the “see-saw” numbers hypothesis; percep-
tions of refugees according to their means of arrival; and
the links between asylum and resettlement, while discuss-
ing the European developments and global discussion of
the strategic use of resettlement.
Résumé
La réinstallation devient de plus en plus un sujet de préoccu-
pation au niveau international. Les pays de réinstallation
traditionnels se tournent vers l’Union Européenne et s’atten-
dent à ce qu’elle développe de nouveaux programmes pour
étendre l’usage de cette solution durable. Certains pays de
l’UE semblent extrêmement intéressés dans la réinstallation
en vue du potentiel qu’elle offre pour résoudre les problèmes
de passages clandestins de personnes, de hauts niveaux d’ar-
rivée de demandeurs d’asile et des tendances généralisées
anti-immigrants. Cet article met de l’avant quatre argu-
ments principaux : les raisons d’avoir une politique de réin-
stallation; l’hypothèse des nombres en balançoire à bascule;
la perception variable qu’on a des réfugiés selon leur mode
d’arrivée; et, les liens entre le droit d’asile et la réinstalla-
tion – tout en discutant des développements européens et
des pourparlers globaux sur l’utilisation stratégique de la
réinstallation.
1. Introduction
“Resettlement” has become one of the most frequently heard
words in refugee protection policy discussions in the devel-
oped world. After decades as a barely-spoken-of means by
which some refugees reached western states, the approach is
centre stage. To countries that have long-standing resettle-
ment programs there are aspects of this re-emergence that
must be bemusing, aspects that pose challenges to their own
programs, and aspects which are encouraging for the future
of a protection tool and durable solution which has served
them and refugees well. The existing resettlement countries
inspired the discussion: their initiative coincided with new
European interest in resettlement as an approach to refugee
protection.
While wanting to see other states get involved and take
on part of the resettlement caseload, traditional resettle-
ment countries are also concerned that resettlement should
be well managed by all actors involved for the benefit of all.
Within the framework of the Convention Plus and Forum,
launched in 2002 and 2003 respectively by UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees, Ruud Lubbers, the “Strategic Use
of Resettlement” has become the foremost subject of dis-
cussion. Further, both the U.S. and the EU have sought
independent studies in the past year, assisting policy makers
and political leaders in thinking about changes in, or the
development of, resettlement programs.1
The European Union is starting to think about resettle-
ment and how it could be used strategically. The develop-
ments which have led to this discussion included the
challenges posed by human smuggling, over-burdened asy-
lum systems in which some 50 per cent of the applicants
were being rejected by the end of all appeals process, and
an increasingly pervasive tide of anti-immigrant sentiment.
By the time a significant number of the EU Member States
had engaged the discussion in 2003, the United States was
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facing significant challenges to its long cherished and well-
established resettlement program. Those challenges were
highlighted by heightened security concerns in the after-
math of 9/11, but in fact started earlier. The program had
become somewhat anachronistic. It was well suited to the
Cold War, but ten years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall
it had not significantly changed in terms of groups targeted.
In changing priorities on groups eligible for selection, the
program also needed to adapt its methods.
In the final paragraphs of this Introduction the four key
points or arguments to be made in the article will be set out.
The following section will explain “resettlement” as a con-
cept and a protection tool in more detail. After posing
questions about who could benefit – and how – from the
strategic use of resettlement, the focus will be on Europe
and on the “global” level discussions about resettlement of
the past few years. The challenges to resettlement, as well as
the opportunities which resettlement appears to some pol-
icy makers to offer, will permeate the rest of this article.
Key Points
1. There is a risk in discussing the “strategic use” of resettle-
ment that motives, goals, and functions of the policy ap-
proach become confused and conflated in such a way that
the essence of resettlement as a humanitarian program could
be lost. This is a serious challenge not only to resettlement
itself, but to refugee protection policies in developed coun-
tries generally – and a challenge which needs to be addressed.
2. While attention is on resettlement there may be room
to deal with the difficulties presented by asylum and irregu-
lar entries, in a climate which is more beneficial to good
policy making and supportive of refugees than that which
prevails today. This is already evident in both Canada and
the U.S. This is an opportunity. There lies potential danger,
however, in the use states could make of resettlement as a
“humanitarian alibi” for restrictive asylum policies. This is
demonstrated to an extent in Australia, where asylum seek-
ers are sometimes characterized as “queue jumpers,” i.e.,
people who should have waited for the resettlement pro-
gram to find them, if indeed they are refugees. The notion
underlying the use of the alibi is that people who wait in
camps are deserving of compassion and protection,
whereas those who take the initiative, even if they are from
the same population group as those later resettled, might
be vilified. Ironically, we could hypothesize that asylum
seekers are in fact showing the type of resourcefulness that
would qualify them as those who will succeed in western
societies and economies.  Nonetheless, in Europe, some
focus on positive aspects to refugee admissions could be
used effectively to change the debate which currently casts
all irregular arrivals as asylum seekers, and describes them
all – whether determined to be refugees or not – as scroungers
on the welfare states of European countries.
3. Any discussion on the strategic use of resettlement
that is based on a see-saw hypothesis in regard to arrival
numbers is not only refutable, but also dangerous to the
desirable establishment of broad resettlement programs on
a global level. The see-saw hypothesis suggests that, whereas
in Europe today there are significant asylum-seeker arrivals
and is very little resettlement, if in the future there were to
be significant resettlement, there would be a decrease in
asylum-seeker arrivals. This hypothesis is mostly being em-
ployed in the EU discussions; but it is being broadly em-
ployed by officials (from Europe and beyond), NGOs, and
others in an attempt to “sell” resettlement as an effective
protection tool. That resettlement is an effective protection
tool is not at issue here; but “selling” the policy to politi-
cians and the general public, as a tool for effectively reduc-
ing asylum-seeker arrival numbers, is a great risk. The risk
is that a very good resettlement program, which is very
effective in broadening access to refugee protection, might
be undermined if it were to be evaluated on the basis of its
impact on asylum-seeker arrival numbers.
4. Resettlement is not asylum, or part of an asylum
system. Rather, both asylum and resettlement are elements
in a broad, well-functioning and robust international pro-
tection system.
2. What Is Resettlement?
Although the word “resettlement” is much used, not every-
one knows what it is – or means the same thing when they
use the term.2 In this article, and in the broadest policy sense,
resettlement involves the selection and transfer of refugees
from a state in which they have initially sought protection
to a third state which has agreed to admit them with perma-
nent residence status. Resettlement can be used when refu-
gees can neither return to their country of origin, nor be
protected effectively and integrate in their country of first
asylum. There are three traditional and equal goals of reset-
tlement:  protection,  provision  of durable solutions, and
burden sharing with host countries.
Asylum is a much better known tool of refugee protec-
tion in the developed world, especially in Europe, so it is
useful to describe resettlement in comparison to asylum.
Both resettlement and asylum can offer humanitarian pro-
tection and may form complementary elements in an over-
all refugee protection framework. However, the starting
points of the processes are different. Resettlement is a pro-
gram through which states decide in advance who they can
help and select individuals whose protection they can guar-
antee after arrival. Resettlement can offer a durable solution
in protracted refugee situations and can be a tool for the
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managed arrival of refugees whose status is determined in
advance of their travel. Domestic asylum systems, in con-
trast, should be maintained for people who have sought and
requested, by their own means, the protection of a safe and
rights-respecting state. Furthermore, asylum is anchored
firmly in international and domestic law, and carries legal
obligations, particularly in the area of non-refoulement.
Resettlement may be governed by some domestic legal
statutes, but is a discretionary act, and is often based more
in policy than in law, even if admission through a resettle-
ment program conveys legal rights to residence to the indi-
viduals selected.
Resettlement is a much more complex process than in-
itially seems to be the case. It is resource intensive. It is
worth doing well, because resettlement is both about giving
refugees the opportunity to get their lives back and about
reflecting the humanitarian values of receiving societies.
The “right reasons” for doing resettlement include the
traditional goals of offering protection, a durable solution,
and burden sharing; but these goals can be put into effect
by using resettlement to achieve both its  humanitarian
motives and some more utilitarian ends. Hence, UNHCR
and the resettlement countries are engaged in discussion
about the strategic use of resettlement in the context of the
Convention Plus Forum.
2.1 Which Countries Resettle?
Eighteen countries have resettlement programs.3 Four of
them do not have operating programs as such; they are either
under review by UNHCR or have been suspended from the
list of “emerging resettlement countries.” However, others
are thinking of joining them. If one includes all eighteen
countries listed below, in spite of the caveats about their
operation, there has been a doubling of resettlement coun-
tries over a period of some seven years. The eighteen pro-
grams, in order of magnitude of permitted annual
admissions, are run by: United States, Canada, Australia,
Sweden, Norway, Finland, New Zealand, Denmark, Neth-
erlands, UK,4 Ireland, Brazil, Chile, Iceland, Argentina,5
Benin,6 Burkina Faso, and Spain.7
The U.S. has had an annual ceiling8 of between 70,000
and 132,000 refugees each year over the past decade, and a
total admission of 807,008 refugees through resettlement
between 1993 and 2002. Canada has a target of some 12,000
refugees for resettlement across three types of resettlement
program. Australia aims to receive 12,000 refugees per year,
with precise resettlement numbers dependent on the
number of asylum applications receiving a positive deter-
mination and thereby qualifying them as among the 12,000.
Over the three fiscal years 2001–2003, Australia resettled
28,106 people and granted asylum to 10,437.9 In the EU,
Sweden has a quota for 1,000 resettlement places, Finland
for 750, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK have 500-
person programs, and Ireland has a 10-case program, which
could receive up to 60 people in total (in family groups
which each form one case).
In preparation for the discussion below, it is worth not-
ing  that the  U.S.  has  also has received  822,224  asylum
applications between 1993 and 2002. Canada currently
receives between 30,000 and 40,000 asylum applications
annually. Australia’s asylum-seeker arrival numbers fluctu-
ate. The country received just over 12,366 applications in
2001 and just over 6,000 in 2002. All EU member states
which resettle receive many more asylum applications than
they have resettlement places10 – and all experience the
fluctuations in asylum statistics over the years that are
common in the EU. No country that carries out resettle-
ment in significant numbers has seen spontaneous arrivals
of asylum-seekers disappear or dwindle as a result of reset-
tlement. None of these countries has engaged in resettle-
ment with the goal of offering an alternative route to the
smuggling and asylum-seeking path.
2.2 How Does Resettlement Work?
Selection for resettlement is not as easy as saying, “Well,
there are 20 million refugees, so let’s resettle 100,000 of
them.” The process requires criteria to establish which of
those refugees need resettlement (who cannot return, and
are unable to integrate locally) and who among them might
“fit” well with the domestic and foreign policy agendas of
the receiving government. These agendas may have little
impact on resettlement policies – it might be a matter of
giving the destination state a humanitarian profile through
the resettlement of the very vulnerable, for example. But the
larger the resettlement program, the more various interests
and needs must be addressed.
The U.S. has the most sophisticated resettlement system,
with three active priority categories for selection. These are:
(1) those referred by UNHCR; (2) those falling within
designated groups of ethnic origin and/or country of first
asylum; and (3) family members of people already in the
U.S. from specified countries and who are refugees.
For all three categories, the refugee definition of the
Protocol applies, modified to say that they should be out-
side the United States, rather than outside their country of
origin. The second category is the most-used route. Its
groups are designated annually, through consultation by
the State Department with other government departments,
UNHCR, and NGOs. The individuals to be resettled within
these groups have assistance in preparing their cases from
NGOs. UNHCR’s role is limited to consultation during the
group designation process. UNHCR has no central role in
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the third category either. However, its role is key to the first
priority. Until 2003 these referrals were only of individuals; in
2003, in an effort to fill a significant shortfall in U.S. arrivals,
an agreement was reached for UNHCRtorefer a group – some
7,000 refugees in Cote d’Ivoire. As is usually the case, the
paperwork for all of these refugees was to be completed by a
contracted NGO actingasanOverseas Processing Entity,prior
to U.S. Immigration Service interviews with the candidates.
Nonetheless, as always, the U.S. would not necessarily accept
all UNHCR referrals: it is possible that the Immigration Serv-
ice staff do not find a given individual to be a refugee according
to their definition, especially as UNHCR employs its Mandate
definition, which covers those fleeing conflict, for example.
Indeed, the U.S. is striving to accept 50 per cent of UNHCR
referrals, a clear indication that more than half have been
rejected in recent years.
Since 2002, Canada has moved to limit applications for
resettlement made directly by refugees to Canadian embas-
sies, and has placed a much greater emphasis on referrals,
chiefly from UNHCR. The Immigration and Refugee Pro-
tection Regulations of June 11, 2002, (section 150), require
that applications for refugee resettlement be accompanied
by a referral from a “referral organization” or from a private
sponsor. Section 143 of the Regulations clarifies that “refer-
ral organization” means UNHCR or another organization
with which the Department of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion has concluded a Memorandum of Understanding.
Canada relies currently on UNHCR referrals and private
sponsors to identify refugees for resettlement, and has not yet
concluded agreements with any NGOs or other agencies.
The EU Member States with resettlement programs, and
Norway, rely exclusively on UNHCR referrals for selection.
The process is cumbersome, and some, most especially the
Netherlands, also refuse some 50 per cent of the referred
cases on the grounds that their Immigration Service finds
the candidates not to be refugees according to the Dutch
Aliens Act.
UNHCR is currently charged with referring some 50,000
refugees per year worldwide to all programs, including the
U.S. and Canada. With relatively high rejection rates in
some states, based not only on definitional differences but
also, for the Europeans, on what they view as incomplete
information on the referral forms, UNHCR is putting a lot
of resources into resettlement. For the Europeans this in-
cludes a whole system of clarifying claims and funnelling
referrals from the field through Geneva headquarters to the
capitals (the U.S. and Canada receive referrals directly in
the field, including through a new “hub” system in west and
east Africa). All in all, it is resource intensive, and not clear
that UNHCR either can or should be performing some of
the functions, beyond identifying people as refugees. In
spite of the apparent faith placed in  the  agency in the
current European and Canadian systems, and the rhetoric
about UNHCR’s role in new resettlement programs, the
high rejection rate shows there is not much trust among
resettlement countries that UNHCR really knows who is a
refugee.
3. What Might Be Strategic about Doing
Resettlement: For Whom, and Why?
One of the goals of resettlement is solidarity with countries
of first asylum. The experiences of Southeast Asian countries
in  the  1970s  and 1980s demonstrate  this. Thailand and
Malaysia were persuaded to offer initial protection to hun-
dreds of thousands of refugees from Vietnam only because
they were  assured that countries in North America and
Australia as well as several European states would resettle the
refugees. Austria was likewise in a position to receive and
temporarily offer refuge to many thousands of refugees from
Hungary in 1956, because other states were willing to organ-
ize their onward movement and protection. While solidarity
is a traditional goal of resettlement, the implementation of
the policy in search of this goal can also prove to be strategic.
It can provide a way in which resettlement can serve a foreign
policy function, while achieving a principled aim. Resettle-
ment can be strategically used to support countries of first
asylum, encouraging them to continue to offer at least short-
term effective protection when major crises occur in neigh-
bouring states.
Another goal of resettlement is to offer a durable solution
to refugees who are in a protracted situation in which their
short-term protection in a country close to home may have
been effective, but they can neither return, nor reasonably
stay in that country of first asylum for a long time. By
offering a durable solution where resettlement is the only
solution possible for an individual or group of refugees,
resettlement countries can meet the protection needs of the
refugees concerned, and can offer those refugees an oppor-
tunity for durable, effective protection, without the need to
take personal risks to achieve that.
These applications of resettlement show how it can be
effectively used as one of three durable solutions in a com-
prehensive approach, to the benefit of refugees and several
states. Resettlement can also serve foreign and domestic
policy agendas through resettlement criteria which respond
to interest groups, as outlined above.
One myth about resettlement is the idea that states use
resettlement for economic immigration purposes. Across
Europe there are policy makers, practitioners, and academ-
ics who imagine the U.S., Canada, and Australia sending
their officials into the world to find the most intelligent
refugees in order to resettle them. Only one of these coun-
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tries, Canada, uses “an expectation of self-sufficiency
within three years” as a criterion in resettlement selection.
Canada does not apply this criterion to vulnerable cases. In
other cases it is applied chiefly through the instinct of the
selecting officer; such an expectation is not measurable,
and, anyway, it simply means having employment and not
depending on welfare benefits. Any job will do: it is not a
question of looking for the brightest or fittest. One only has
to look at the groups that have been resettled in recent years
to see that the notion of choosing the brightest and most
likely to succeed is a total myth. That is not to say that the
refugees resettled to the U.S., Canada, and Australia do not
succeed – very many of them do. However, that success can
be put down to policies that impact the refugees after
selection for resettlement and not to criteria for selecting
them in the first place.
The emerging thought in Europe is that if a country
resettles refugees, as opposed to seeing them arrive sponta-
neously, the authorities know who they are, the people
enter legally, and the process can be managed. To the extent
that this can be true for those who are resettled, this think-
ing is correct: where it fails is in the implicit notion that
because resettlement is conducted, there would not be
spontaneous arrivals. It is ironic that as the EU sees oppor-
tunities  to  manage arrivals  and have more information
about the individuals arriving in advance, the U.S. is pre-
cisely seeing challenges to its resettlement program in the
context of security concerns. On the one hand the State
Department has concerns about US government personnel
travelling  to certain locations for  resettlement selection
interviews. On the other hand, Immigration officials cer-
tainly do not want to admit someone who turns out to be
a terrorist in waiting. While the program has never pre-
viously been abused in this way, and is unlikely to see such
abuse  given  the protracted  camp life  from which  most
resettlement candidates are drawn, it is a concern which since
9/11 seems to be bringing the program down. However, the
U.S. has always used its resettlement program for foreign
policy purposes, with the State Department as a driving force,
while in the EU the push to consider resettlement is coming
from Justice ministries and not Foreign Affairs.
4. The European Context
The discussion about appropriate ways to permit refugees
to arrive lawfully in EU Member States is taking place out-
side the context of the work program set out in the Treaty
of Amsterdam. A link to the work program is being made by
the suggestion that resettlement has something to do with
relations between the EU and countries in the regions of
origin of refugees; however, such an international relations
perspective to resettlement is not part of the experience of
the traditional resettlement countries. Refugee resettlement
is being considered more widely both in individual govern-
ments11 and in  the European  Commission, as a  way of
managing the arrival of pre-selected refugees.
In the debate about resettlement in Europe, the role it
can play in managing refugees’ arrival in an orderly fashion
has become prominent, and is seen as one facet of the
potential strategic use of this protection tool. In the Con-
clusions to the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003,  the
European Council took note of:
...the Communication from the Commission, which is focusing
on more accessible, equitable and managed asylum systems,
and invite[d] the Commission to explore all parameters in
order to ensure more orderly and managed entry in the EU of
persons in need of international protection, and to examine
ways and means to enhance the protection capacity of regions
of origin with a view to presenting to the Council, before June
2004 a comprehensive report suggesting measures to be taken,
including legal implications.
The Communication from the Commission referred to
above was in part a response to proposals tabled by the UK
in February 2003.12 The British government had proposed
that transit processing zones be established in places distant
from the EU, in which asylum applicants would be processed
and, if determined to be in need of protection, moved on at
some point to the EU. This proposal was later dropped, as
there was little or no interest in it from other Member States.
A further proposal, to look at protection in regions of origin,
including capacity building for states in those regions, is still
under investigation and the subject of pilot projects run by a
small group of states including Denmark and the Nether-
lands. However, several Member States, including the Greek
Presidency, and the two major traditional resettlement coun-
tries in the EU, Sweden and Finland, raised objections to the
pursuit of the UK proposals. In the earliest iterations by the
UK, these proposals included the notion that some people
might be removed from the regions of origin if their long-
term situation proved unstable. This was termed “resettle-
ment” but little resembled traditional understandings of the
concept. Concepts change over time, of course, but attaching
resettlement to a duty for refugees to remain in their region
of origin in the first instance would be a fundamental shift in
thinking. Resettlement has long been attached to support for
first asylum in regions of origin – but that is rather as an
inducement to states in the regions to remain open to refu-
gees, and not a constraint on those refugees’ onward move-
ment should they choose to seek asylum spontaneously
further afield.
There seems to be a split between EU Member States on
what the motives for resettlement are and what functions it
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might allow the states to fulfill. Some governments appear
to see assistance in resolving the asylum crisis as a motive
for resettlement, whereas others see that  as a potential
function  for this  policy approach, which they maintain
should be pursued for only humanitarian motives. This
analysis of the divergence of opinion speaks to the first key
point set out in the Introduction. It also raises questions
about how strategically the discussion on whether or not to
conduct resettlement is being managed within the context
of a common goal of European integration on  refugee
protection, asylum, and immigration issues.
The relationship, or relative absence thereof, between
asylum and resettlement is perhaps one of the most confus-
ing points for European policy making. There would natu-
rally be knock-on effects for the European Union’s
emerging Common Asylum System if the Member States
decide to pursue resettlement to a greater extent than is
currently the case. These effects would be on the level of the
definitions used to determine protection need in the two
systems: procedures employed for status determination
and integration measures. Indeed, the area of proactive
integration policies may be one of the most fertile for a
positive impact of resettlement on asylum and immigration
generally in Europe. Through advance knowledge of who
will be arriving, tailor-made integration programs can be
established, starting with pre-departure orientation for the
refugees and orientation information for the receiving
communities. Such orientation can make expectations on
all sides more realistic than might often be the case and
provide a basis of motivation for the refugees to learn the
language and become independent actors in their new com-
munities.
Expanding resettlement in Europe could be useful in the
EU asylum debates for the potential it offers to transform
public, political, and expert debate on refugee protection.
Information about who refugees are, where they are coming
from, and  media  (among others) following their active
integration as part of the new society are all facets of reset-
tlement which could usefully be used by governments to
promote positive, humanitarian approaches to protection
– and should be used to apply to refugees arriving through
asylum as well as those who are resettled. This is not to say
that resettlement offers answers to the perceived problems
with, or even crises in, the asylum systems in European
states today. Nor should resettlement provide any govern-
ment with a humanitarian alibi for reneging on its human
rights obligations to grant asylum to those who have fled
persecution in their state of origin. Rather, resettlement
should coexist with asylum as two elements in a compre-
hensive international protection policy. While attention is
on resettlement there may be room to deal with the diffi-
culties presented by asylum and irregular entries, in a cli-
mate which is more beneficial to good policy making and
supportive of refugees than that which prevails today.
As noted above, the European Commission and some
Member States see a potential for resettlement to be strate-
gically used to manage a greater number of legal arrivals to
the EU Member States than at present. As the number of
such arrivals, in 2003, is less than 3,500, it can be said with
certainty that the development of resettlement  capacity
across the EU would facilitate the managed arrival of more
refugees. If this was the sole supplementary strategic end,
beyond the humanitarian motives and traditional goals of
protection, durable solution, and solidarity, it could cer-
tainly be achieved. Success in this straightforward achieve-
ment would not affect or be affected by fluctuations in
asylum-seeker numbers. However, the strategic goal im-
plied by some is that the managed arrival of more refugees
would reduce the number of people arriving to seek asylum.
There is no objective evidence that this see-saw hypothe-
sis in terms of numbers (shifting from high asylum arrival
and low numbers of resettlement places to high numbers of
resettlement places and low asylum arrivals) could in fact
be valid. Even in the days of more than 150,000 resettlement
places per year, the U.S. never saw a drop in asylum-seeker
numbers. It did, however, see a significant drop when it
introduced asylum reform legislation in 1995. Perhaps one
reason for which such reform legislation could be introduced
was the fact of there being a large resettlement program (at
that time with a ceiling of 112,000 places – and in fact a drop
in the resettlement ceiling in 1996 to 90,000 places).13
One reason for which resettlement does not impact
asylum-seeker numbers is that the pools of people drawn
on for resettlement and those groups which are likely to
seek asylum are quite different. Many people seeking
asylum in western states come from complex situations
of conflict and human rights abuses in major states (e.g.,
Russia) or places in which western governments hesitate to
make clear-cut foreign policy choices backed by action. To
resettle refugees, and more especially IDPs, from some of
these situations would be to make a very decisive foreign
policy statement. For example, the EU Member States are,
in 2003–2004, seeing high levels of Russian asylum seekers.
To enter Russian territory to select refugees for resettle-
ment, and especially to select Chechens and others who
claim to be suffering persecution now (as opposed to the
U.S. resettlement activities in Russia which focus on past
persecution), is quite unimaginable. What is more, in many
of these cases, UNHCR is not present to protect and assist
the populations, and so is not present to refer them for
resettlement. In the cases of both Canada and the U.S., the
lists of top ten countries of origin of asylum seekers see only
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one or two cases of overlap with the lists of countries of
origin from which most resettlement is conducted.
Furthermore, those people who are in need of resettlement
are most often those with no durable solution to their pro-
tection need, as opposed to people with an immediate and
urgent protection need. Asylum systems in western states
have generally developed in such a way that they seek very
clear indications of immediate danger to the individual seek-
ing refuge. The refugee in need of resettlement might not be
able to present such indications to the satisfaction of an
asylum adjudicator, but will have no long-term protection
and security. As such, it may be necessary, for example, to
resettle from states that might otherwise be considered “safe”
for the purposes of asylum, but not for long-term protection
of particular groups. This was the case, for example, when the
U.S. decided to resettle some 10,000 Bosnians from Germany
in order to avoid their (forced) return to a Bosnia that the US
considered not yet safe following the Dayton Accords of 1995.
The see-saw hypothesis forms a major distraction in the
construction of strategic and sensible resettlement policies. It
is not impossible to imagine the EU Member States setting
up resettlement programs with selection criteria so tainted by
a desire to address smuggling and high asylum seeker arrivals
from particular countries that they would actually be ineffec-
tive in addressing genuine resettlement needs. Nor is it im-
possible to envisage a resettlement program developed
according to principles and criteria appropriate to an effec-
tive use of resettlement as a tool of international protection,
which after a couple of years would be deemed a failure
because of (unrelated) rises, or lack of changes, in asylum
seeker arrivals. The linkage does not appear to be strategic for
global refugee protection.
As far as the European context is concerned there is a
need, indicated in the discussion above, to reinforce the
fourth key point set out in the Introduction: resettlement is
not part of an asylum system. Both resettlement and asylum
are elements in an international refugee protection system.
Since Tampere, the EU Member States and European Com-
mission have discussed the development of a Common
European Asylum System. Asylum is something all Mem-
ber States have long offered to refugees arriving in their
territory and asking for protection. It was a natural place to
start. The European Commission  set  out by discussing
resettlement as part of the emerging common asylum sys-
tem. However, it is not clear that this is appropriate, seman-
tically, politically, or as a matter of fact. For example, those
EU Member States with resettlement programs generally
conduct them separately from their asylum systems, as do
all other resettlement countries.
Asylum and resettlement are not interchangeable either
as a means of arrival for any particular individuals or as
approaches to refugee protection. Rather, both asylum and
resettlement are part of any full tool kit for dealing with
international protection needs. I would suggest that Europe
should both broaden its approach and clarify its terminol-
ogy. Conducting resettlement as part of a Common Euro-
pean International Protection System, of which an asylum
system would also be a part, would be a useful and strategic
approach.14 In this case, once agreements on resettlement
as a policy approach and not a legal obligation were in place,
the Member States and Commission would have room,
within a Common European International Protection Sys-
tem, to recast the other elements, including asylum, which
have a legal basis. European populations would thus get the
distinct, and accurate, impression of a new management
approach to refugee issues.
The crucial question is whether there  is  political will
among a larger number of Member States to engage in reset-
tlement. Before beginning any type of resettlement program
the EU must be fully aware of the necessary level of resource
commitment and the need to cultivate partners that would
allow the program to function optimally. In getting to the
point of perhaps starting a broader resettlement program, the
EU Member States must also think strategically about more
than just the impact of resettlement on refugee protection:
they need to ask if developing this approach is good for
European integration, or whether the discussion itself is po-
tentially divisive. They need to ask if conducting resettlement
would be positive for Europe’s role as a humanitarian player
in the refugee protection regime. Clearly, the EU’s motives
for and goals in doing resettlement would be important in
defining its role in the global refugee protection regime, and
therefore the European standing in global discussions on the
strategic use of resettlement is important to consider.
The Global Level: From Annual Tripartite
Consultations to Convention Plus and Forum
The progress towards discussion of the strategic use of reset-
tlement at a global level has been going on for some six years.
One point of interest about this progress is that it has in
general involved only UNHCR and resettlement countries:
countries in the regions of origin of refugees from or through
which refugees are resettled have not been involved at all,
NGOs have been involved on some occasions, and resettled
refugees themselves have been involved only on one occa-
sion (the conference on the integration of resettled refugees
in Norrköping, Sweden, in 2001).
A 1994 UNHCR evaluation of resettlement highlighted
several areas in which improvements could be made for better
UNHCR operation of resettlement opportunities.15 Among
the recommendations of the report (many of which, in-
cluding this one, were acted upon) was the following:
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A multilateral  forum for discussion and planning between
UNHCR and major resettlement country governments and non-
governmental organizations must be established, to ensure a fine-
tuning of complementary interests and strategic planning to
address the evolving needs for resettlement. Governments should
be encouraged to reflect on the current realities in terms of needs
for resettlement and to seek to modify policies and procedures
accordingly. Providing a forum for discussion of the wide range of
innovative steps taken by individual governments in recent years
could provide fertile ground for such crucial developments.16
This multilateral forum was created in the form of a
Working Group on Resettlement. That group is made up
of states and UNHCR.17 Coinciding with its meetings, An-
nual Tripartite Consultations, which involve states,
UNHCR, and NGOs, are held.
One way in which existing resettlement countries felt
they could usefully expand the role of resettlement was by
expanding their own number through the addition of new
resettlement countries. One development towards this end
was the creation in 1997 of a Trust Fund. This fund applied
the money which otherwise would have been spent on fifty
resettlement places each in Norway, Denmark, and Swe-
den, with additional funds (not in lieu of resettlement
places) from Finland and the U.S. The Fund financed in-
itiatives to encourage emerging countries of resettlement
and projects to enhance opportunities for individual and
small groups being resettled and to improve the implemen-
tation of resettlement activities.
Part of the initial, Nordic thinking was that it would be
more efficient to have some resettlement places in small,
poorer countries which would be paid for by richer coun-
tries. However, in December 1998, UNHCR pointed out
that this thinking was flawed, not least because the assump-
tion that poorer countries would welcome the opportunity
to develop refugee protection potential with funding from
elsewhere proved inaccurate.18 It became apparent to
UNHCR that the capacity for  the development of  new
resettlement programs outside Europe was limited. While
eight emerging countries of resettlement had joined the
ranks by 2000, only three of them were still active in 2003
(Brazil, Chile, and Ireland). The UK joined this list in 2003
also, but it, like Ireland, was not stimulated by activities
supported by the Trust Fund.
The U.S.  contributions to  the Trust Fund supported
other initiatives, including the Norrköping conference on
integration of resettled refugees, and the two Handbooks,
one on resettlement programs and admission to those pro-
grams and one on integration.19
Meanwhile, the Global Consultations process led to an
Agenda for Protection, which addresses both the burden-
sharing aspects of resettlement and the need for a stronger
focus on durable solutions.20 In order to build on  this
Agenda for Protection, the High Commissioner called for
the development of special agreements to complement the
Convention, which he called “Convention Plus.” An arena
called the Forum was established for the discussion of
particular subjects of interest. The Forum’s first meeting,
on 27 June 2003, focused on resettlement. At this meeting,
the Canadian delegation tabled a discussion paper, “Reset-
tlement and Convention Plus Initiatives,” suggesting that
resettlement, in the context of an approach to all durable
solutions, could be an ideal area for partnership agreements
between states, UNHCR, and NGOs. This paper had been
in development in the Working Group on Resettlement,
under Canadian chairmanship, after the initiative to dis-
cuss the strategic use of resettlement was put forward by
Australia. Drawing largely on its own resettlement program
for context, the Canadian delegation suggested that it
could, together with UNHCR, lead further discussions be-
yond this initial meeting. The Canadian document also
drew attention to important points which are key to con-
temporary discussion of resettlement, including:
• Solutions are only durable when they result in a refugee
having secure legal status in the country providing the
durable solution.
• As an  administrative decision,  resettlement can  be  a
timely and cost-efficient durable solution.
• The inclusion of protection-based criteria that go be-
yond the 1951 Convention would help to make resettle-
ment a more flexible tool.
The three goals of resettlement as a durable solution, a
protection tool, and a burden-sharing instrument remain
paramount.  As  noted above, resettlement programs are
nonetheless often shaped by other functions.
It should be noted that motives, goals, and functions are
quite different facets of any policy. In the case of resettle-
ment, the motive is humanitarian; the goals are protection,
a durable solution, and burden sharing; and the function
can be any of the strategic uses to which states put resettle-
ment, e.g., to support their foreign policy aims, to show
solidarity with domestic ethnic communities, or, poten-
tially, to counterbalance their asylum systems by offering a
means for managed and organized arrival for refugees as
well as the irregular entry which the seeking of asylum often
necessitates.
The UNHCR Working Group on Resettlement, in its
paper The Strategic Use of Resettlement,21 noted that the
managed and orderly arrival of persons in need of interna-
tional protection could result from resettlement. The Com-
mission’s Communication of 3 June 200322 indicates that
EU Member States might indeed find the political will to
pursue resettlement as a way to provide for “managed and
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orderly arrivals of persons in need of international protec-
tion.”  This could  potentially  be an intended  additional
function of resettlement for EU states. However, the motive
of resettlement should remain humanitarian. It is a norma-
tive contention: but converting a function (a desired or
intended consequence) of a policy into a motive for oper-
ating that policy is quite dangerous, as it leads to the poten-
tial undermining of a path which originated in genuinely
altruistic and noble motives.
The concern to manage the arrival of refugees can be, and
is being, interpreted as a desire to limit asylum seeker
admissions. The Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR), in
response to the Working Group paper The Strategic Use of
Resettlement, stated that “Resettlement… is not an ‘orderly’
alternative to asylum.”23 However, managing the arrivals of
more refugees successfully, and using resettlement strategi-
cally to achieve that goal, should not have to mean that
states seek to reduce or prevent asylum seeker arrivals.
Reactions such as CCR’s are in large part inspired by the
European debate on resettlement as a response to high
asylum seeker numbers, as described above, as well as by
Australian practice. In order to avoid such reactions, it
would be  useful if  EU  Member State  governments, the
European Commission, and other resettlement countries
which seek to stimulate greater participation in resettle-
ment by the EU states could make clear that their intention
in promoting this potential function of resettlement is not
to suggest that the EU could or would close down, or further
limit, access to asylum procedures. Although the European
Commission has frequently written that asylum must re-
main open, both its, and Member States’, representatives
send mixed signals as the UK “vision” paper and the dis-
cussion it provoked demonstrate.
Although resettlement could not accomplish the func-
tion of significantly reducing asylum seeker numbers, it
could certainly be used as a response to the indicator, which
high arrival numbers give, that there is a refugee crisis going
on somewhere. Then EU Member States could engage ac-
tively in selecting, resettling, and protecting refugees,
thereby allowing or persuading states in the region of origin
to provide protection to more people, knowing onward,
managed movement is available. Such a use of resettlement
would be strategic in offering protection, showing solidarity,
and bolstering the EU’s reputation as a humanitarian actor.
Conclusions
The strategic use of resettlement is a multi-faceted idea.
European states would have several strategic reasons for
engaging in resettlement other than any potential or desired
impact on asylum seeker arrival statistics. They are also the
most likely new resettlement countries, the ones that have
the potential to create the most effective new, large-scale reset-
tlement programs. Collective strategic engagement in resettle-
ment could significantly strengthen the EU harmonization
process. It would also be strategic for the EU to engage in
resettlement because the image of resettled refugees is generally
more positive than that of asylum seekers, but also often has a
“knock-on” effect, meaning that the public gets more informa-
tion and understands more about the situations from which
both resettled refugees and asylum seekers have fled.
As a matter of strategy, EU Member States should view
resettlement as part of a comprehensive approach to pro-
tection, which includes other durable solutions and is
linked to the EU’s external relations as well as its overall
immigration and asylum policy development.
These benefits of the development of broader resettle-
ment programs can be much more important in demon-
strating that governments are managing the refugee
protection issue well than any impact those programs may
or may not have on actual numbers of arrivals.
For Europe, and therefore for the global refugee regime,
to engage strategically in resettlement, the distinction be-
tween motive, goals, and supplementary functions needs to
be established. Resettlement needs to be clearly distin-
guished from asylum. The debate on resettlement places
replacing asylum arrivals  numerically should be closed.
Any  potential impact on asylum seeker  numbers could
better be handled as an unintended consequence, rather
than as a direct desire without which resettlement will be
viewed as ineffective. The perception of resettled refugees,
through appropriate explanations of policy and the people
affected in the media, for example, should be managed in
such a way that one of the knock-on effects between reset-
tlement and asylum seeking is an improved image for all
refugees as people in need of protection. In this way, the
strategic use of resettlement could change the face of pro-
tection, and benefit all refugees and all states engaging in
the full range of protection tools.
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on Resettlement (see note 1, above) and in “The EU as a Global
Player in the Refugee Protection Regime,” Working Paper No.
35, Academy for Migration Studies in Denmark (AMID),
forthcoming at http://www.amid.dk/pub/index.html.
15. John Fredriksson and Christine Mougne, Resettlement in the
1990s: a review of policy and practice, UNHCR EVAL/RES/14,
1994.
16. Ibid., 9 (emphasis added).
17. The European Commission and IOM are also involved in the
Working Group. It reports to the UNHCR ExecutiveCommittee.
18. Danish Immigration Service, “Evaluation of UNHCR’s Trust
Fund for Enhancing Resettlement Activities” (undated mimeo
with the author of this article).
19. UNHCR, Division of International Protection, Resettlement
Handbook (Geneva, July 1997; revised July 2002) and
UNHCR, Refugee Resettlement: An International Handbook to
Guide Reception and Integration (September 2002).
20. Goals 3 and  5 in the Agenda for  Protection, http://www.
unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=EXCO
M&id=3d3e61b84. See also EC/GC/02/7 Strengthening and
expanding resettlement today: dilemmas, challenges and oppor-
tunities, for Global Consultations on International Protection
4th Meeting, Third Track.
21. The Strategic Use of Resettlement: A Discussion Paper Prepared
by the Working Group on Resettlement WGR/03/04.Rev3 (3
June 2003).
22. Commission of the European Communities, Towards more
accessible, equitable and managed asylum systems.
23. Canadian Council for Refugees, A Working Paper on the
Strategic Use of Resettlement (June 2003).
Joanne van Selm is Senior Policy Analyst, Migration Policy
Institute, Washington, D.C., and Senior Researcher, Institute
for Migration and Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam.
She also is President of the International Association for the
Study of Forced Migration and Co-editor of the Journal of
Refugee Studies.
Volume 22 Refuge Number 1

